6. Conclusion: Blueprint and Case for Transformation



This report has described a world that is failing at an objective it has the means to achieve. The shortfall against the SDGs is not a shortfall of capital, of proven solutions, of deployable technology, or of people able to absorb and use them. All four exist in surplus, and technology is compounding each of them. What does not exist is the architecture that would connect them, and the reason it does not exist is that the order which once supplied such architecture has decayed while its guarantor has moved to a different business. The consequence is not that abundance fails to arrive. It arrives. The consequence is that its distribution is being settled by default, in a decade that will not repeat, by actors whose interests do not include diffusion.

1. Where the World Stands

Ten years into the Sustainable Development Goals and four from their end date, less than 20% of targets are on track. The position underlying that number is best stated as two columns that do not currently connect.

On one side, the world had a record 65 state-based armed conflicts in 2025;[110] nearly 120 million people were forcibly displaced;[111]; global public debt has crossed US$100 trillion;[112] military expenditure was at US$2.9 trillion, the eleventh consecutive year of increases;[113] the three most recent years – 2023, 2024, and 2025 – are the three warmest in 176 years of records;[114]; trade was down from 61% of world GDP in 2008 to 56.6%;[115] economic policy uncertainty surpassed all prior records;[116] and America, the order's guarantor, has withdrawn from 66 multilateral bodies.[117]

On the other, the world had US$505 trillion in liquid financial assets, compounding at c.10% a year; utility-scale solar was 41% cheaper than the lowest-cost fossil alternative, with 91% of newly commissioned renewable capacity below the cost of any new fossil option; a set of proven, commercially operating solutions capable of advancing close to 90% of SDG targets with no further breakthrough required were identified; and close to three billion people entered connectivity, credit and formal markets for the first time.

What distinguishes 2026 is that both accounts are true simultaneously and almost nothing connects them. Blended finance, the instrument designed expressly to bridge the two, was at 0.1% of the requirement in 2024.

2. Synthesis: HyperCrisis as an Ordering Problem

This report describes a world in hypercrisis and what it takes to turn that into a catalyst for rapid and global change at unprecedented scales for the benefit of all.

Two transitions are running at once – a civilisational shift from the Industrial Age to the Systems Age, and a world-order transition that is eroding the institutions built to absorb them. With the repositioning of the order's guarantor, the two resolve into a hypercrisis: crises multiplying at precisely the moment the capacity to answer them is being dismantled. Three systems – human, planetary and technological – are in simultaneous transition, the first two are in deficit and losing capacity through withdrawal, the third is being formed with vast investment and as part of a great power contest. Four surpluses exist; capital, solutions, technology, and the people to absorb and use them. However, with the loss of a world leader, world level progress has stalled. Technology is shaping three waves, the first is based on 19 core technologies and offers the opportunity to raise the world, the second is based on six systemic technologies that are highly contested already, and the third is a product of the integration and cumulative effect of these technologies to reshape the world.

In the midst of the first and second technology wave, the terms are being set now, by two powers, in the absence of anyone else at the table.

While today's hypercrisis reads as intractable, it is not. One extreme view is that there is enough, and it just needs to be shared, the other is that there is more to be had, and it should be given to those that pioneer it and it will trickle down. Both instincts are false, and acting on them would waste a decade of one of the most exciting periods in history – the transition of civilisations.

3. Wave One: The Creation of New Markets, 2026–2035

Phase One begins World Investment Plan: US$123 trillion of assets built across ten themes and every major economy, deploying the technologies that are commercially ready today into the two pools of latent demand – the Global South, and the populations excluded from the wealth generated around them inside advanced economies. Its purpose is not to close the gap the Goals describe. It is to build the markets that make the gap uneconomic.

Five conditions determine whether it executes.

- *The Core is formed and becomes operational.* Without a governing architecture, the founding members, the financial compact, the technology compact, and the Global South Compact, the World Investment Plan has no deployment vehicle.
- *Systems of enterprise built ahead of capital.* Countries enter in cohorts set by institutional readiness. Capital arriving ahead of absorptive capacity does damage of its own, and the evidence for that proposition is thirty years old.
- *Sovereign risk repriced and externalities priced.* Rating development assets on observed default experience rather than sovereign ceilings, and recognising environmental costs as liabilities rather than disclosures, are the two market architecture changes without which the private capital the plan requires cannot flow.
- *Technology access standardised and open.* Without open access terms – data ownership in the jurisdiction that generates it, local equity participation, open interoperability standards – technology deployment builds dependency rather than capability. The plan's legitimacy with receiving markets depends on this distinction being visible and enforceable.
- *Domestic delivery leads.* The advanced-economy half of the plan must produce visible results for the Core's own underserved populations inside a single parliamentary term, because the programme's binding constraint is the political durability of its sponsors rather than the readiness of its recipients.

Phase One of the World Investment Plan can add an estimated US$316 trillion in cumulative global GDP over the next decade, generate market-rate returns across US$89 trillion of its investments, and a US$42.7 trillion profit pool for the solution owners who build and operate its assets.

The aim would be to provide four critical ingredients for a new rules-based order to emerge: a Core of countries that see the opportunity and create institutions to develop these; a body of standards, rules and regulations for true mass inclusion at home and abroad; functioning systems of enterprise across the world; and a functioning alternative to the two-superpower geopolitical model. These set the basis for the transition to the second phase of the transition.

4. Wave Two: The Rollout of Systemic Technologies, 2036–2050

The second phase involves the deployment of the six systemic technologies as they mature, and carries the remaining US$85 trillion of climate investment, supporting a global economy of up to US$751 trillion by 2060. Its impact arrives in three stages: super-performing systems already underway, supra-human systems through the 2030s, and the planetary-scale integration that defines the 2050 horizon.

Whether the world reaches this figure or reverts to the lower, US$475 trillion trend-growth path is not determined by the technology itself. It depends on whether the institutions built in Phase One – the

Core, the Compacts, the standards they establish – extend into Phase Two, distributing the gains as broadly as the technology makes them possible to produce.

The current decade is the critical juncture for deciding the path ahead.

5. Navigating the Transition

The stakeholders in the future are drivers of the development of a far superior, sustainable and secure world. The key creators of that future are:

- *The founding Core.* A Core set can form the basis of global economic change as the precursor to a new order; Europe, and India are identified as that Core. Their role is to coalesce around economic cooperation and initiate a World Investment Plan that delivers prosperity at home and turns needs into markets across the world.
- *Governments of receiving economies.* The main task is to introduce systems of enterprise and meet the condition for their participation in the most significant economic boom in history.
- *Capital allocators.* The task is to fund the building of assets for each of the ten themes of the World Investment Plan facilitated by a more world risk and opportunity sensitive thematic approach to the rapid changes across the world.
- *Solution owners.* The redesign of proven solutions for the price points and margins of lower-income markets is the commercial precondition for the largest expansion of addressable market in the sector's history.
- *Multilateral institutions.* Multilateral institutions have a critical change management role to play in supporting a systemic change with the depth and breadth of their experience of the world system and each member state, requiring them to focus on system ahead of project or need. That task falls first to the incoming UN Secretary-General, who takes office as one era gives way to the next. The architecture set out in this report is intended to support that mandate

6. Abundance for All

Abundance is already arriving at scale as companies cross trillion-dollar valuations and near trillion-dollar capital expenditure commitments are made to support technology roll-out.

The question is not whether the world can afford to level itself up, nor whether the technology exists, nor whether the returns justify the investment, all three propositions having been clearly established. It is whether a sufficient coalition assembles before the terms are set without it.

Aggregate growth continues, technologies are deployed at scale into the markets already able to receive them, and standards are being de facto set by the two great powers who price access based on the leverage they possess. Others acquire platforms, models and compute they do not control, and thus development becomes dependency. Inside the advanced economies, the populations already excluded remain so, and the distance between what is visibly possible and what is actually

delivered continues to widen. Nothing in these countries looks like a failure, but dependency compounds quietly, ultimately creating a more divided and inequitable world.

History provides important lessons. The distributional architecture of every previous technology wave was determined by institutions that arrived late, were incomplete, and only after the costs of their absence had become politically unbearable. Britain legislated after fifty years of flat wages. The post-war settlement followed two world wars. The pattern is that the architecture arrives in the face of upheaval, rather than ahead of it. The question is whether that pattern will hold in the coming great transition, or whether the realisation of what is at stake is sufficient to produce a different outcome.

5. Wave Three: Convergence and the Post-Scarcity Transition, 2050 onward

Phase Three begins when the six systemic technologies of Phase Two complete their convergence into a single, unified system: fusion removing the energy constraint, nanotechnology removing the materials constraint, and AI removing the cognitive constraint on discovery and deployment. The result is not incremental abundance but a genuinely post-scarcity condition – not the absence of all want, but the removal of the fundamental limits that have bound productive capacity throughout every prior civilisation.

At that point, GDP stops functioning as the relevant measure. GDP was built to capture how efficiently scarce inputs – labour, capital, energy, space and time – are allocated across competing uses. Once the constraints themselves are removed, the binding question is no longer allocation but access: who participates in the system, and on what terms. The appropriate metric shifts from growth rate to distribution, and from GDP per capita to human capability – a civilisational change requiring different measurement too.

Phase Three is not a forecast of what the technology will do. It is a description of what becomes possible once scarcity itself is no longer the organising constraint of human activity, and a reminder that the architecture capable of distributing that outcome broadly must be built now, in Phases One and Two, because none will exist by the time it is needed. If mankind cannot govern the 'god-like' technology of the third wave, it will be governed by it.

In Summary

- Three waves determine what kind of world emerges. The first wave is deploying. The second wave's governance architecture is being set now, by two powers, in the absence of anyone else at the table. The US$276 trillion gap between the two second-wave trajectories is what the current decade determines.
- Surplus Meets Crisis. Record conflict, displacement, debt, and uncertainty coexist with US$505 trillion in liquid capital, technology able to solve almost any problem, and three billion people newly entering formal markets. The gap between them – not any single crisis – is the challenge.

- From Need to Market. US$123 trillion of assets by 2035, across both demand pools, adds an estimated US$316 trillion to global GDP and builds the standards, coalition, and enterprise systems Phase Two depends on.
- The Decade that Decides. Technology deployment is following the industrial revolution's pattern: transformative gains, concentrated distribution, architecture arriving late. A world that reaches 2036 without the architecture for mass inclusion does not negotiate the terms of the systemic technology wave – it inherits them.
- Sequence Is Strategy. Systems of enterprise precede deployment; domestic delivery precedes international participation; asset-class formation precedes capital. Out of order, the plan reproduces the failures it was built to avoid.

The question is not whether the world can afford this, or whether the technology or the returns justify it, all three are established. It is whether a coalition assembles before the terms are set without one.

At this moment in history, when the rules of engagement have collapsed across multiple domains at once, an audacious bid to create a zone of inclusive rules-based conduct – one that channels the coming investment and technology boom toward the many rather than the few on mutually respectful terms – offers something exceedingly rare: a genuine chance to raise the world, treating its human, planetary, and technological capacity not as competing claims but as a single system whose value can best be maximised together.

APPENDICES

1. Methodologies

i. GDP and Profit Uplift from the World Investment Plan

Objectives. The Force for Good Report 2026 seeks to build on the analyses from previous Capital as a Force for Good reports, quantifying the overall investment requirements and funding gap to achieve the SDGs, and the World Investment Plan (WIP), which translated these global requirements into country-level funding needs, and specific assets required. The 2026 report seeks to extend the WIP analysis in two respects:

- GDP Contribution: Quantifying the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) generated at the investment-level. This links the investment plan to the economic output enabled by these investments, providing a measure of the economic growth associated with closing the SDG funding gap.
- Operating Profitability: Quantifying the operating profit pools generated by the assets created, measured over a ten-year horizon. This provides a view of the financial value generated by operating the underlying assets, making the opportunity to mobilise private capital more tangible.

By quantifying both the economic output and the operating profitability generated by the investment plan, the 2026 report aims to (i) demonstrate the economic and financial returns to closing the SDG funding gap, (ii) identify specific asset and country-level economic opportunities, and (iii) strengthen the case for directing private, public and blended capital towards the ten investment priorities.

Analytical Framework. The 2026 analysis extends the WIP by quantifying, at the asset-level, the GDP uplift attributable to the investments and the operating profitability of the assets created. The analyses draw the country– and asset-level investment figures established in the WIP as their starting point, over the same ten-year horizon (2026–2035), maintaining consistency with the prior analysis. The analysis was carried out under two parts:

Part 1 – GDP Contribution. The first part of the analysis estimates the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) generated by the investments across the ten investment priorities. The uplift attributable to each country and priority was estimated as follows:

- Calculation of GDP Contribution. For each country and priority, the GDP contribution was calculated as the product of the country's investment in that priority, the corresponding global priority multiplier, and a country efficiency factor:

  GDP Contribution = Country Investment for the Priority * Global Priority Multiplier * Country Efficiency Factor

- Country Investment for the Priority. The country-level investments for each priority were sourced from the World Investment Plan 2025 analysis.

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